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Environmental Diplomacy with Afghanistan’s Taliban Government: Pakistan's National Interest

  • Writer: Muhammad Zain ul Abidin
    Muhammad Zain ul Abidin
  • 3 days ago
  • 5 min read
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Why this matters?

  1. Security and political strain are real and acute. Cross-border militant movements and deadly clashes along the Pakistan–Afghanistan frontier have surged in 2025, producing military operations and border closures. Pakistan has publicly accused militants based in Afghan territory of mounting attacks inside Pakistan; reciprocal clashes and high alert along the border have followed.

  2. Afghanistan’s governance and capacity constraints hamper cooperation. The Taliban administration faces severe fiscal and humanitarian stress and limited institutional capacity, a reality that constrains Kabul’s ability to manage environmental risks or control non-state armed groups effectively. International aid shortfalls and natural disasters have further weakened Afghan institutions.

  3. Shared environment, shared risks. Pakistan and Afghanistan share watersheds and ecosystems (Kabul River basin and other transboundary catchments), where degradation, deforestation, and poor watershed management exacerbate floods, sedimentation, and drought vulnerability downstream in Pakistan. Transboundary water management is therefore not abstract policy, it is a direct determinant of Pakistani lives, crops and infrastructure.

  4. Humanitarian interdependence is growing. Pakistan has begun large-scale repatriation actions and deportations of Afghan nationals in 2025, reflecting migration pressures that are entwined with security and environmental shocks in the region. These movements complicate bilateral cooperation but also underline the need for shared, stable solutions.)

Hence, Pakistan faces a dual challenge, a direct security threat linked to non-state actors based in Afghanistan, and environmental risks that cross borders and will only worsen unless jointly managed.


Strategic principle

Link environmental cooperation to national security and accountability. Pakistan should offer concrete, limited cooperation that advances Pakistani environmental resilience, but it must be conditional, monitored, and tied to measurable Afghan action on militant sanctuaries and law-enforcement commitments.


Concrete, actionable policy

1) Immediate confidence-building through technical, apolitical cooperation

Offer narrowly scoped, time-bound, technical projects that directly reduce Pakistan’s flood and sediment risk and do not empower belligerent actors:


  • Joint Flood Early-Warning Network: Share hydro meteorological data from upper-basin gauges, joint modeling, and alert protocols for major rivers (Kabul tributaries). Start with pilot sites and remote data-sharing (requires minimal on-ground Afghan presence and can be mediated jointly with a neutral partner such as the UN or World Bank).Why: Early warnings save lives and reduce economic loss, and are defensible as humanitarian, not political, cooperation.


  • Transboundary Sediment & Reforestation Pilot: Fund small-scale watershed restoration in key catchments (costed and implemented through vetted international NGOs/UN agencies), focused on erosion control upstream of Pakistani flood-prone areas. These must be transparent, jointly monitored, and employ local communities vetted by both sides.Why: Restoring vegetative cover reduces flood peaks and sediment loads that damage Pakistani irrigation infrastructure.


These activities should be framed as technical, humanitarian, and reversible, easy to scale up as trust is demonstrated.


2) Conditional, phased security-environment linkage

Make environmental cooperation contingent on measurable Afghan action against militant sanctuaries:


  • Condition 1: For each technical cooperation tranche, require verifiable Afghan action to police specific militant nodes (e.g., documented interdictions, handing lists of suspects, or arrests coordinated with Pakistan intelligence channels). Pakistan must set clear, evidence-based benchmarks for action, with third-party verification (UN/OIC/China). Why: This guards against normalizing a status quo where militant groups operate with impunity while receiving diplomatic benefit. Recent cross-border attacks show such a linkage is necessary.


  • Condition 2: Insist on safe-passage guarantees and operational coordination for Pakistani engineers and scientists working on cross-border projects; if Kabul cannot guarantee security, projects must be mediated through international agencies. Why: Pakistani personnel safety is paramount; projects must not expose Pakistani staff to undue risk.


3) Leverage international finance and technical partners (do not go it alone)


  • Bring donors in as fiduciaries and project implementers: Pakistan should seek donor-backed programs (World Bank, ADB, GCF, UNDP) that fund watershed restoration and resilience projects in transboundary basins, with Pakistan and Afghanistan as co-beneficiaries and independent monitoring. Why: Donor involvement reduces political leverage of the Taliban, provides accountability, and mobilizes necessary funds and expertise. Climate and development analyses show Afghanistan lacks resources for these tasks alone.


  • Use third-party mediation when needed: China, the UN, or a mutually agreed regional partner can host verification mechanisms for security/environment commitments, lowering bilateral tensions while keeping Pakistani red lines in place. Past informal meetings brokered by regional actors show practical value for thawing ties when direct diplomacy stalls.


4) Institutionalize transboundary mechanisms with safeguards

  • Negotiate a narrowly framed “Water & Resilience Protocol” within a Pakistan-Afghanistan technical secretariat: data sharing, MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), and joint contingency planning for flood/drought. Start with non-controversial topics (hydrology, sediment loads), and only expand after verified progress on security issues. Why: Institutional mechanisms endure beyond political cycles and reduce misperception in crises. Research on Kabul River cooperation underscores the value of technical institutions.


5) Domestic preparedness and strategic messaging

  • Harden Pakistan’s own resilience while offering cooperation: invest in embankments, upstream storage, wetland conservation, and urban drainage, so environmental diplomacy is not a hostage to Kabul’s behavior. Simultaneously, launch a public diplomacy narrative that frames Pakistani cooperation as pragmatic, conditional, humanitarian, and rooted in national interest. Why: Demonstrating domestic resilience reduces leverage of spoilers and strengthens Pakistan’s negotiating stance. Recent cross-border incidents show Pakistan must not be seen as unilaterally vulnerable.


Opportunities for Pakistan:

  1. Reduce flood and sediment damage to Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa irrigation and infrastructure through upstream catchment management, direct economic savings and fewer displacements.

  2. Leverage international climate finance for Pakistan-led resilience projects that also favor Pakistani contractors, research institutions, and monitoring capacity — turning a security challenge into a development opportunity.

  3. Strengthen international legitimacy: Pakistan can present itself as a pragmatic regional leader ,willing to cooperate on shared risks while defending its sovereignty and citizens. This posture appeals to donors and partners.


Opportunities for Afghanistan:

  • Jobs and capacity building in watershed restoration, community forestry, and hydro-meteorological monitoring, financed by multilateral projects and implemented by NGOs with Pakistani technical partners.


  • Reduced disaster risk for Afghan communities themselves, the humanitarian case for cooperation benefits both sides, not least in earthquake/humanitarian responses.


Red lines and deal-breakers (Pakistan’s non-negotiables)

  1. No diplomatic normalization or scaling of cooperation until Kabul demonstrates credible action against TTP and other anti-Pakistan militant groups. Evidence-based benchmarks and third-party verification are essential.

  2. No unilateral concessions that weaken Pakistan’s sovereign control of border security or water rights. All measures must preserve Pakistan’s territorial integrity and established riparian rights.


Communications strategy

  • Publicly frame initiatives as humanitarian, technical, and reversible. Emphasize Pakistani leadership and conditionality: “We will cooperate where cooperation reduces Pakistani risk and is reciprocated in security action.”


  • Use international partners to convey that Pakistan’s approach is pragmatic, not expansionist, making it easier for donors to fund projects while monitoring compliance.


Anatomy of a successful approach:

Environmental diplomacy with an unstable neighbor cannot be naïve. Pakistan’s approach must be strategic, sequenced, and guarded: start small (technical cooperation), tie every tranche to verifiable security progress, scale with international fiduciaries, and always retain the means to protect national interests unilaterally. When done properly, such diplomacy both improves Pakistani resilience and converts a source of bilateral friction into an avenue for controlled, interest-based engagement.


 
 
 

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